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Qualified Intermediary or Bust?
By Susan C. Morse
Recently Deutsche Post ex-CEO Klaus Zumwinkel,
billionaire Igor Olenicoff, and a UBS banker smuggling
diamonds in a toothpaste tube generated headlines re-
garding the problem of incomplete residence taxation of
income paid to out-of-country bank accounts. Mundane
withholding forms and laboriously developed and per-
fected computer systems can provide the solution. The
Obama administration’s recent proposals concerning the
qualified intermediary and nonqualified intermediary
(NQI) systems attempt to translate popular outrage over
wealthy Americans’ hidden offshore account income into
a concrete systems proposal for addressing the problem.
Room for International Cooperation
A QI is a non-U.S. financial institution that enters into
an agreement with the IRS to fulfill information gather-
ing and reporting responsibilities and submit to audits of
its compliance with that agreement. An NQI does not
enter into such an agreement. At first glance, it appears
that the administration’s proposals seek to define the QI
system as the exclusive avenue for banks that wish to
hold U.S. securities for their clients. In other words, the
proposed statutes appear to use burdensome presump-
tions for NQI accounts to drive non-U.S. financial insti-
tutions, regardless of size or the relative importance of
U.S. customer base, into QI status.1
However, the administration proposals would provide
some wiggle room by permitting administrative excep-
tions to adverse NQI presumptions — for example, for
‘‘payments that the Treasury Department concludes
present a low risk of tax evasion.’’2 Any final legislation
should retain that provision allowing for the exercise of
administrative discretion, in large part because it would
allow the IRS and Treasury to pursue the goal of infor-
mation reporting through bilateral or multilateral efforts
that may not exactly correspond to the QI regime.
Existing QI and NQI Rules
The 2000 QI and NQI regulations3 address the situa-
tion when U.S.-source reportable payments flow from the
United States to an account at a non-U.S. financial
institution. In that situation, more than one large inter-
mediary typically stands between the holder of a non-
U.S. account and the U.S.-source reportable payments
that may flow into that offshore account. For example, if
assets in an account at a non-U.S. bank are debt or equity
instruments issued by U.S. corporations, there are one or
more potential withholding agents in the United States,
such as the issuing corporation and the global custodian
that may hold the securities.4 Of course, U.S. taxpayers
(although generally not non-U.S. persons) must also pay
U.S. income tax on income resulting from investments in
non-U.S. securities and other assets, but the 2000 regs did
not focus on this pattern.
The 2000 regs generally charge the non-U.S. firm
closest to the client (and therefore to the client’s informa-
tion) with information gathering responsibility. If that
non-U.S. firm is a QI, it usually may assume withholding
responsibility or shift that responsibility (presumably for
an additional charge) to a U.S. withholding agent.5 If QIs
pass information to U.S. withholding agents, they may
do so on a pooled basis, stating that a certain amount of
a dividend payment is subject to a reduced 15 percent
withholding rate, for example. That avoids disclosing
client identities and provides a confidentiality advantage,
because clients may not want to reveal their identities to
governments and because QIs presumably prefer not to
share their client lists with the other financial institutions
in the payment chain as a condition to obtaining U.S.
withholding tax relief.6
1See, e.g., Kristen Parillo, ‘‘Obama’s QI Proposals Would
Impose Significant Burdens on Foreign Banks, Practitioners
Say,’’ Tax Notes, May 11, 2009, p. 679, Doc 2009-10238, or 2009
TNT 86-7.
2Treasury Department, General Explanations of the Administra-
tion’s Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals (May 2009), Doc 2009-
10664, 2009 TNT 89-44 [hereinafter 2010 green book], at 43, 45;
Id. at 51, 52 (anticipating ‘‘regulatory authority to provide
additional exceptions’’ to Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts (FBAR) reporting presumptions).
3E.g., reg. section 1.1441-0 et seq.
4Cf. OECD, ‘‘Report of the Informal Consultative Group on
the Taxation of Collective Investment Vehicles and Procedures
for Tax Relief for Cross-Border Investors on Possible Improve-
ments to Procedures for Tax Relief for Cross-Border Investors,’’
at 7-8 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter OECD report] (providing chart
of possible intermediaries).
5See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000-1 C.B. 387, section 4, sections
3.02 and 3.06, Doc 2000-1307, 2000 TNT 6-7 (permitting opting
out of withholding responsibility for reportable amounts).
6See Susan C. Morse and Stephen E. Shay, ‘‘Qualified Inter-
mediary Status: A New U.S. Withholding Role for Foreign
Financial Institutions Under Final U.S. Withholding Regula-
tions,’’ 27 Tax Mg’t Int’l J. 331, 339 (1998) (noting confidentiality
advantages of QI status).
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Strengthening QIs’ Obligations
The QI and NQI rules contain a clear explanation of
the underlying premise that the account holder, not a
nominee or agent, is the beneficial owner, although
foreign corporations are respected as non-U.S. persons.7
The rules focus on non-U.S. holders of non-U.S. accounts
and the related interest in protecting source-based taxa-
tion, but they also anticipate U.S. holders of non-U.S.
accounts and the related concern of protecting residence-
based taxation. For example, the QI agreement offered by
the IRS requires a QI to disclose the identity of, and
amounts received by, U.S. individuals and other nonex-
empt U.S. account holders.8
The obligation under the QI agreement to disclose U.S.
clients is not watertight. In particular, the agreement sets
out a procedure for banks to follow to reconcile their local
bank secrecy laws with their obligation to disclose U.S.
clients to the IRS. That process has an option that does
not include client disclosure — the QI may exclude U.S.
securities or other assets that generate U.S.-source report-
able payments from the U.S. client’s account.9 That leaves
QIs with the attractive customer-relations strategy of
encouraging disclosure-averse U.S. clients to divest as-
sets that generate U.S. reportable payments, such as U.S.
Treasury bonds, and replace them with other assets, such
as other governments’ low-risk debt. Court documents
show that UBS followed this strategy.10
One provision in the administration’s recent proposals
attempts to close that loophole by requiring that QIs
identify all of their account holders that are U.S. per-
sons.11 Unlike the disclosure provision in the QI agree-
ment, this requirement would apply to accounts in which
U.S. persons hold only non-U.S. securities. Another
modification would require QIs themselves to report
payments to U.S. account holders on Form 1099, instead
of permitting them to leave that task to a U.S. withhold-
ing agent.12 This change would place the obligation for
reporting more securely in the internal processes and
computing systems of the gatekeeper closest to the client,
as commentators have recommended.13 Another pro-
posal would give Treasury regulatory authority to re-
quire affiliates of a QI to also act as QIs.14
Pushing Banks Out of NQI Status
Besides increasing the responsibilities of QIs, the ad-
ministration proposals would try to ‘‘encourage [NQIs]
to become QIs’’15 by making the NQI alternative unap-
pealing under default withholding rules applicable to
returns on U.S. portfolio holdings. Under current law, an
NQI is supposed to forward detailed client information
to U.S. withholding agents or face withholding on client
accounts under applicable presumptions. The regulations
also require an NQI to disclose to a U.S. withholding
agent any situation in which the NQI has actual knowl-
edge that a client is a U.S. nonexempt recipient.16
However, those NQI disclosure requirements lack
teeth. A failure to report the U.S. or non-U.S. status of a
client results in the presumption that a payment is made
to an ‘‘unknown, undocumented foreign payee,’’ which
in turn requires withholding at a rate of 30 percent on
payments of interest and dividends but does not require
withholding on payments of gross proceeds.17 Also, the
United States has limited ability to ferret out situations in
which U.S. account holders may provide false non-U.S.
documentation to NQIs because NQIs (unlike QIs) do not
agree to any audit or other U.S. oversight.18
7See reg. section 1.1441-1(c)(6)(1) (defining beneficial owner).
The John Doe summons in the UBS case attempts to encompass
situations when taxpayers established foreign sham corpora-
tions and claimed they were eligible to provide foreign-person
Form W-8 certifications. Instead of referring to beneficial
ownership ‘‘under U.S. tax principles,’’ as the regulation does,
the summons describes the section 7609(f) John Doe class as any
U.S. taxpayer with ‘‘signature or other authority . . . with respect
to any financial accounts,’’ except for taxpayers who had
supplied UBS with Forms W-9 and been subject to Form 1099
reporting. Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition For
Leave to Serve John Doe Summons at 5, In re Tax Liabilities of
John Does (S.D. Fla. No. 08-21864) (June 30, 2008), Doc 2008-
14509, 2008 TNT 128-21.
8See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, supra note 5, sections 6.01, 6.03
(requiring a QI to provide enough information to permit with-
holding agents to report and withhold on payments to each
nonexempt U.S. account holder, assuming that the QI does not
itself assume Form 1099 reporting responsibility for those
accounts).
9Other options include obtaining a Form W-9 or authority to
disclose from the account holder. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, supra
note 5, at section 6.04.
10See UBS, ‘‘Qualified Intermediary System: U.S. Withhold-
ing Tax on Dividends and Interest Income From U.S. Securities’’
1 (Oct. 2004) (‘‘A QI has to ensure that US Persons . . . either
declare themselves to the US tax authorities . . . or are no longer
permitted to invest in US securities’’), available at declaration of
Daniel Reeves, United States v. UBS AG (S.D. Fla. No. 09-20423),
Exhibit 10, at 1, Doc 2009-15457, 2009 TNT 129-24. See also Joann
M. Weiner, ‘‘Disqualifying UBS From the QI Regime,’’ Tax Notes,
Dec. 8, 2008, p. 1097 at 1099, Doc 2008-24550, or 2008 TNT 237-8
(describing UBS exploitation of this exception).
112010 green book, supra note 2, at 42.
12Id.
13See, e.g., ‘‘House Ways & Means Comm. Hearing on Issues
Involving Bank Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American Tax-
payers,’’ statement of Stephen E. Shay, Ropes & Gray, Boston at
11 (Mar. 31, 2009) (recommending assigning the task of infor-
mation reporting to U.S. persons to QIs).
14See 2010 green book, supra note 2, at 42.
15‘‘Shulman Describes IRS International Enforcement Priori-
ties at OECD Conference’’ (June 4, 2009), Doc 2009-12458, 2009
TNT 104-36 [hereafter Shulman OECD remarks].
16See reg. section 1.1441-1(e)(3)(iv).
17See reg. section 1.1441-1(b)(3)(v)(B) (requiring 30 percent
withholding); reg. section 1.6049-5(d)(3)(ii) (providing that
withholding on gross proceeds is not required for payment to a
non-U.S. intermediary unless the payer has actual knowledge
that a nonexempt U.S. person is the beneficial owner of the
payment).
18Some administration releases have used accusatory lan-
guage when describing NQIs. That seems imprudent if the goal
is to persuade NQIs to join the U.S. compliance effort. See, e.g.,
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘Leveling the
Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incen-
tives for Shifting Jobs Overseas’’ (May 4, 2009), Doc 2009-10037,
2009 TNT 84-44. (‘‘Under this proposal, the assumption will be
that these institutions are facilitating tax evasion, and the
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Several administration proposals would attempt to
make the NQI option unappealing, at least for accounts
whose assets include U.S. securities. One proposal would
subject all payments to NQIs to a default 30 percent
withholding on U.S.-source interest, dividends, and other
fixed or determinable annual or periodic income, regard-
less of self-certification. Non-U.S. persons erroneously
subjected to withholding could claim a refund.19
Another proposal would require 20 percent withhold-
ing on broker proceeds when paid to an NQI in a
jurisdiction lacking ‘‘a comprehensive [U.S.] income tax
treaty that includes a satisfactory exchange of informa-
tion program.’’20 It’s unclear whether satisfactory would
mean automatic, and in a usable electronic format. Hope-
fully it would, although that meaning of satisfactory
would go beyond the OECD model.21 Finally, a pair of
proposals would establish an evidentiary presumption
that an account held at an NQI requires the filing of a
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)
and that the failure to file an FBAR is willful, and
therefore subject to significant civil and criminal penal-
ties, if the account balance at an NQI exceeds $200,000 at
any point in the year.22
Automatic Information Sharing Outside QI System
Even if the proposed NQI presumptions reflect a
correct judgment that the NQI system as it now exists
simply does not work, it may still be possible to repur-
pose the NQI model with the help of cooperative infor-
mation exchange efforts outside the QI system. The
proposals leave room for a possible third choice, one that
might be based on bilateral or multilateral reporting
agreements rather than the U.S. QI system. Treasury and
the IRS have consistently engaged in such bilateral and
multilateral discussions in the past, although the result-
ing arrangements have not yet produced effective, auto-
matic information exchange.23
Effective global information reporting might or might
not necessarily follow the QI model, even though IRS
Commissioner Douglas Shulman has said that ‘‘the en-
hanced QI system proposed by the President is a good
starting point eventually for a multilateral QI system.’’24
A January 2009 OECD report detailed three possible
approaches to structuring a cross-border information
exchange arrangement. First, a financial institution or
other intermediary might report directly to the countries
where each of its customers is resident, consistent with
the approach of the QI proposals discussed here, and
those countries would also report to the countries where
payments are sourced. Second, an intermediary might
report to the country where it is located or regulated, and
that country’s tax authorities would then transmit the
information to countries where customers are resident,
consistent with the approach of the European Union
Savings Directive in its requirements for interest report-
ing. Third, an intermediary could report information to
the country where payments (for example, interest and
dividends) are sourced, consistent with the approach of
the existing QI rules as applied to non-U.S. account
holders, and the source country would pass information
on to the residence country as appropriate.25
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of
those structures, but any of them — or perhaps a combi-
nation — could support a working information exchange
program. As the OECD report acknowledges, the devel-
opment of a multilateral agreement on uniform comput-
erized reporting protocols presents a central challenge in
any case. Those protocols may not take the form of IRS
forms W-9 and W-8BEN and other forms in the W-8
family, and they may be inconsistent with the know-
your-customer rules approved for QI use by the IRS.26 It
is important that Treasury and the IRS retain the ability to
participate in the broader effort to construct a global
information sharing system without being confined to
the particulars of the QI rules.
Even short of multilateral agreement on a global
information sharing system, non-QI bilateral information
burden of proof will be shifted to these institutions and their
account-holders to prove they are not sheltering income from
U.S. taxation.’’)
19See 2010 green book, supra note 2, at 43.
20Id. at 44. One question is whether the same requirement
would apply to partnerships that do not elect to be withholding
foreign partnerships. This point is important for disclosure-
sensitive foreign investors in investment partnerships. Cf.
Stephen E. Shay and Elaine B. Murphy, ‘‘Notice 2002-41 Guid-
ance for Withholding Foreign Partnerships,’’ 31 Tax Mg’t Int’l J.
560, 562 n. 25 (2002) (noting that gross proceeds returns and
associated withholding may have particular importance for
some foreign partnerships).
21A ‘‘satisfactory’’ exchange of information provision should
require automatic provision of information — in contrast, for
example, to the OECD model information sharing agreement,
which requires information sharing on request. See, e.g., Lee A.
Sheppard, ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual Information
Sharing,’’ Tax Notes, Mar. 23, 2009, p. 1411, Doc 2009-6201, or
2009 TNT 54-7 (noting also that governments should develop
systems to effectively use automatically shared information).
22See 2010 green book, supra note 2, at 51, 52; see also Fred
Feingold, ‘‘Further Guidance Needed on Who Must Report
Foreign Accounts,’’ Tax Notes, May 25, 2009, p. 1023, Doc
2009-9113, or 2009 TNT 98-11 (arguing that the FBAR proposal
goes too far, because ignorance of reporting requirements, and
not willful intent to evade tax, may cause failure to comply with
FBAR filing).
23See William L. Burke, ‘‘Tax Information Reporting and
Compliance in the Cross-Border Context,’’ 27 Va. Tax Rev. 399,
427-431 (2007) (noting development of increased cross-border
information exchange and coordinated audits); Kenneth R.
Petrini et al., ‘‘Inter-Governmental Cooperation and Informa-
tion Sharing — Where Are We Now?’’ 85 Taxes 43, 46-47 (2007)
(noting that although governments may have routine or auto-
matic information exchanges, specific requests make up the
most significant part of cross-border exchanges and estimating
the annual number of outbound requests at between 100 and
500 and the number of inbound requests at 1,500 or less).
24Shulman OECD remarks, supra note 15.
25See OECD report, supra note 4, at 16-19.
26Id. at 20-21; see also Morse and Shay, ‘‘Qualified Intermedi-
ary Status, Act II: Notice 99-8 and the Role of a Qualified
Intermediary,’’ 28 Tax Mg’t Int’l J. 259, 262-265 (1999) (outlining
rules permitting QI reliance on local know-your-customer
rules).
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sharing efforts might sometimes give the IRS and Treas-
ury enough confidence that non-U.S. financial institu-
tions automatically share adequate information with the
U.S. tax authorities. For example, perhaps local European
banks with small numbers of U.S. clients could satisfy the
U.S. need to know about the existence of those clients by
building on the banks’ existing savings-directive-based
internal systems. Treaty information-exchange provisions
expanded to require automatic exchange of information
might also provide sufficient assurance. Other govern-
ments might be amenable to building on treaty relation-
ships to accomplish the goal of automatic information
exchange27 — and the cooperation of foreign govern-
ments could provide other benefits for the United States,
including possible assistance in enforcing the obligations
of QIs or other information sharing institutions.28 An
information-on-request provision like that in the OECD
model and the recently initialed protocol to the
Switzerland-U.S. treaty is not enough,29 but the QI re-
gime is not the only way to accomplish the goal of
automatic information exchange.
Toughening NQI presumptions would provide U.S.
tax authorities with a tool that could be used, most
obviously, to push NQIs into QI status. But thanks to
administrative discretion exceptions, Treasury and the
IRS could also use the tool of disadvantageous NQI
status more flexibly and creatively, responding to oppor-
tunities as systems for automatic tax information sharing
develop around the world. Legislation should retain this
latitude for administrative discretion, and tax adminis-
trators should use it responsibly.
Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s
Tax Opinions
By Stephen B. Cohen
With the Senate about to confirm Judge Sonia Soto-
mayor as associate justice of the Supreme Court, Tax
Notes readers may wish for information and analysis
regarding her three published opinions on federal taxa-
tion, one as a district court judge and two as a court of
appeals judge.
Two of the opinions deal with routine matters and will
therefore be discussed only briefly. The third opinion,
which was reviewed by the Supreme Court, will be
discussed at greater length. Although Chief Justice John
Roberts, writing for the Supreme Court, affirmed the
result in that third opinion, he criticized Judge Soto-
mayor’s reasoning (even though both the solicitor gen-
eral and Treasury had endorsed it) and offered a different
rationale. After a careful reading, I find the rationale of
Judge Sotomayor’s opinion at least as valid as, and
probably preferable to, that of Chief Justice Roberts. I also
find his criticism of her rationale logically flawed and
therefore unwarranted.
Judge Sotomayor’s first tax opinion, Toker v. United
States,1 written when she was a district court judge, was
affirmed without opinion by the Second Circuit.2 The
taxpayers in Toker deducted losses for 1982, 1983, and
1984 in connection with a car leasing partnership. After
receiving a deficiency notice for 1982, they filed a Tax
Court petition contesting the deficiency. Two years later,
in accordance with a stipulation between the taxpayers
and the IRS, the Tax Court affirmed the deficiency, which
the taxpayers paid shortly thereafter. After receiving
additional deficiency notices for 1983 and 1984, the
taxpayers entered into a binding written agreement with
the IRS to settle the dispute and pay the deficiencies.
Other participants in the car leasing partnership de-
clined settlement offers from the IRS and contested
asserted deficiencies before the Tax Court, where they
ultimately prevailed. The taxpayers in Toker then filed
suit in the district court, arguing that the IRS had agreed
to refund their payment of asserted deficiencies if other
partners prevailed in litigation of the claimed deductions.
Judge Sotomayor’s opinion granted the government’s
motion for summary judgment. For the 1982 deductions,
she found that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under section 6512(a), which provides that a
27UBS and its amicus, the Swiss government, have argued
that UBS compliance with unilateral U.S. demands for informa-
tion about clients not already suspected of wrongdoing would
violate Swiss law and that treaty information exchange provi-
sions should determine the UBS obligation to disclose. See, e.g.,
Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the
John Doe Summons, at 23-35, in United States v. UBS AG, No.
09-CV-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009); Amicus Brief of Govern-
ment of Switzerland, at 11-15, in United States v. UBS AG, No.
09-CV-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
28The QI program and other information exchange initiatives
have expanded the de facto enforcement reach of U.S. tax
administration. See Thomas D. Greenaway, ‘‘Worldwide Taxa-
tion, Worldwide Enforcement,’’ Tax Notes, May 4, 2009, p. 561,
Doc 2009-7317, or 2009 TNT 84-12. But U.S. court jurisdiction
still has limits. For example, the Justice Department in the UBS
case pointedly noted that UBS has branch offices in the district
where the government filed suit. See Memorandum in Support
of Ex Parte Petition For Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, at 1,
No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
29See Parillo, ‘‘U.S., Switzerland Initial Protocol Updating
Information Exchange Provisions,’’ Tax Notes, June 29, 2009, p.
1504, Doc 2009-14027, or 2009 TNT 117-1; see also Sheppard, supra
note 21 (explaining insufficiency of OECD information ex-
change provision); Joann M. Weiner, ‘‘Is Switzerland a Tax
Haven?’’ Tax Notes, May 11, 2009, p. 669, Doc 2009-9684, or 2009
TNT 89-25 (explaining conflict over bank secrecy or ‘‘financial
privacy’’ between Switzerland and other nations).
1982 F. Supp. 197 (1997), Doc 97-12312, 97 TNT 86-55.
2133 F.3d 908 (2d Cir. 1997).
Stephen B. Cohen is a professor of law at George-
town University Law Center. He is grateful to Ken
Bacon, Daniel Halperin, Laura Sager, and Ethan Yale
for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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